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Abstract: 
Purpose: The purpose of this paper is to examine wage differences between part- and full-time workers 
distinguishing by gender by using a large Spanish matched employer-employee data set and an econometric 
decomposition that permits to decompose wage differences by quantiles of the wage distribution. 
Design/methodology/approach: The research is based on cross-section matched employer-employee microdata 
from a large representative survey (the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial) which is carried out with a harmonised 
methodology common to all European Union member countries and that has been designed specifically to 
provide reliable evidence about characteristics of the wage distribution such us wage differentials associated 
with the type of working time. From a methodological point of view, the econometric decomposition technique 
proposed recently by Fortin et al. (2011) to decompose wage differences between part-time and full-time 
workers by quantiles of the wage distribution is applied. This methodology has the advantage over similar 
techniques that provides a detailed decomposition of wage differentials and has not been used before to 
examine the wage impact of part-time jobs. 
Findings: The results show that the significant raw wage gap that part-time workers experience in Spain differs 
substantially along the wage distribution. In the case of part-time females, the wage disadvantage is mostly 
explained by their relative endowments of characteristics (and particularly by their lower endowments of human 
capital and their segregation into low-wage sectors) but a significant wage penalty still persists, increasing along 
the wage distribution. In the case of males the wage disadvantage is only found in the lower part of the 
distribution and it is due both to their worst endowments of characteristics and a significant wage penalty. 
Research limitations/implications: The evidence for Spain shows that the part-time work tends to affect differently 
to the wages of males and females, with a higher part-time penalty for males, as predicted by the “flexibility 
stigma” hypothesis, and penalising low-qualified men in the lower part of the wage distribution and high-
qualified women in the upper part of the distribution the most. 
Originality/value: The analysis contributes to the literature by examining wage differences along the wage 
distribution for both genders using econometric decomposition methods, an aspect that to the authors’ 
knowledge has been examined only scarcely in the international literature with non-conclusive evidence and 
has not been examined in previous studies for the Spanish case. In this vein, Spain is a particularly interesting 
analysis case from an international perspective of the wage consequences of part-time jobs, given that in 
contrast with most other advanced countries a majority of part-time employment in this country is involuntary 
and this phenomenon is especially affecting disadvantaged groups. 
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1. Introduction 
Recently, many governments have considered part-time jobs as a response to economic crisis 
and subsequent unemployment rise, given that they offer greater flexibility to firms regarding the use 
of their labour force while at the same time facilitating job creation. However, part-time jobs are 
usually associated to lower wages, high temporality (with lower firing costs), and fewer worker rights, 
like paid holidays or remuneration for medical leave. There is a wide literature confirming this view. 
In particular, part-time employees earn less in terms of hourly wages than full-time employees and 
this wage gap is not explained by differences in the characteristics between both groups of workers 
in term of personal characteristics (Hirsch, 2005, among others). Moreover, part-time workers usually 
have reduced access to social security benefits (Houseman and Matchiko, 1998), fewer labour progress 
opportunities (Tilly, 1990; Russo and Hassik, 2008), smaller pensions (Gimm and Arber, 1998; 
O'Connell and Gash, 2003), less labour stability (Muñoz Bustillo et. al., 2008; Fernández-Kranz et. al., 
2014) and a lower unionisation rate (Belous, 1988).  
In Spain, part-time employment has increased significantly in last decades (from 4.2% in 1987 
to 15.6% in 2015). The current value is still below the European Union and the Euro Area averages 
(19.6% and 21.6%, respectively), mainly due to the fact that Spanish firms have traditionally achieved 
flexibility in the use of their workforce mainly through fixed-term contracts (the fixed-term 
employment rate is of 25.2% in 2015). Spain’s increasing trend of part-time employment will probably 
continue in the future due to legal changes approved recently allowing more flexibility in the number 
of working hours. Taking into account moreover that on the contrary to most other advanced 
countries a majority of part-time employment in Spain is involuntary (more than 63% in 2015, with 
72% for men and 60% for women) and that Spain has currently the highest rate of youth involuntarily 
working part-time in all the advanced countries (the rate of youth 15-24 years working involuntarily 
in part-time jobs is 22% in Spain compared with the OECD average of a 4%: OECD, 2015), there is 
a clear interest to analyse the wage consequences of part-time jobs in this country. 
Previous studies for the Spanish economy have focused on differences in average wages and 
have obtained quite different results regarding the wage penalty of part-time workers when compared 
to full-time ones depending on the dataset employed. For instance, Cebrián et al. (2000) using 1994 
European Community Household Panel (ECHP) household data obtained a positive wage premium of 12 
log points for female part-time workers and of 30 log points for those working less than 15 hours per 
week controlling just for individual characteristics. In a later work, using 1995 ECHP data but 
including additionally job controls like sector and occupation, these authors did not obtain evidence 
of the existence of a wage penalty for part-time female workers (Cebrián et al., 2001). Pissarides et al. 
(2005) and Pagan (2007) using more recent waves of the ECHP also arrived to the conclusion that 
there is a positive wage premium for part-time workers in Spain both for males and females. Yet, 
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these results contrast with those of O'Dorchai et al. (2007) who using matched employer-employee 
microdata from the 1995 wave of the Structure of Earnings Survey observed a wage penalty for Spanish 
part-time males. Finally, Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-Planas (2011) and Fernández-Kranz et al. 
(2014) using administrative register data from the Continuous Sample of Working Histories also estimated 
significant wage penalties for Spanish middle-aged females. 
In this article, we analyse wage penalisation for part-time workers in the Spanish labour 
market, distinguishing among men and women. The database used in the empirical analysis is the 
most recent wave of the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial (Structure of Earnings Survey; hereafter, SES). It is 
a nationally representative survey carried out with a harmonised methodology common to  all 
European Union member countries, making it particularly appropriate for the analysis of wage 
differentials between certain groups like, e.g., differentials associated with the type of working time. 
Another remarkable feature of SES is that its matched employer-employee microdata offer abundant 
information about the characteristics of employees and their jobs and firms. Moreover, given that it 
is a survey to companies data provided by firms does not suffer from the limitations, widely outlined 
in literature, of surveys addressed to households, where the self-reported information about wages 
and working time usually suffers from significant measurement error.  
One of the main novelties of our analysis is that it focuses on wage differences observed along 
the wage distribution for both genders, an aspect that, to our knowledge, has not been examined in 
previous studies for the Spanish case and that has been examined only scarcely in the international 
literature, with non-conclusive evidence. Among the main exceptions, Wahlberg (2008) estimates the 
part-time wage gap in Sweden using quantile regressions and a Swedish register-based dataset with 
longitudinal individual data (LINDA) to find a negative wage penalty for part-time workers across the 
whole wage distribution, rather similar for both genders, with a sharp increase of the penalty in the 
top part of distribution that can be interpreted as evidence of a glass ceiling in part-time employment 
in the Swedish labour market. In contrast, Tõnurist and Pavlopoulos (2014) find a decreasing wage 
penalty for part-time workers along the wage distribution in Germany. Lastly, Colella (2014) analyses 
wage differentials among part-time and full-time working women in a set of European countries. 
Results from a quantile decomposition approach show noteworthy cross-country differences in their 
composition and the magnitude of the wage gap . Hence, although part-time wage gaps are observed 
for women in all of the countries with the exception of Sweden, and they are largely ascribable to 
differences related to occupation and sector, the pay penalty is wider around the upper limit tail for 
Spanish women, highlighting a possible “glass ceiling” effect, while for German and French women 
the wage gap is larger at the lowest part of the percentile distribution, suggesting instead the presence 
of “sticky floor" mechanisms.  
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From a methodological perspective, we apply the econometric decomposition technique 
proposed by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) to decompose wage differences between part-time 
and full-time workers by quantiles of the wage distribution. Although this methodology has the 
advantage over similar techniques that provides a detailed decomposition of wage differentials, it has 
not been used before in this context. The obtained evidence shows that part-time work tends to 
penalise low-qualified men located in the lower part of the wage distribution and high-qualified 
women located in the upper part of the distribution the most.  
The rest of the article is structured as follows. In the next section we present the main 
theoretical hypothesis about wage penalties for part-time workers at different points of the wage 
distribution. In the third section the database used in the study is presented. In the fourth section we 
describe the econometric methodology used in the empirical analysis. In the fifth section we present 
the obtained empirical evidence. Lastly, the article ends with the main conclusions. 
 
2. Theoretical hypothesis 
2.1. Part-time wage penalties for men and women 
Theoretical models predict different wage penalties for both genders. In particular, according 
to the theory of dual labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971), in the secondary segment of the 
labour market there will be a higher presence of female workers and, taking into account differences 
in wage levels between the primary and the secondary segment, a gender wage gap will appear. If this 
duality also holds in part-time jobs, as Tilly (1992) suggests, part-time jobs in the primary segment 
would be filled by male workers while females would be mostly employed in secondary part-time jobs. 
As a result, it can be deduced that the wage penalty associated to part-time jobs will be higher between 
female than between male workers.  
The theory of the ‘flexibility stigma’ (Williams et al, 2013) also poses the existence of a wage 
penalty on those workers that request a reduction of working time for family or personal reasons, due 
to the employer’s belief that they are less devoted to work and engaged with the firm than the ‘ideal’ 
worker. The theory poses the possibility of gender differences since male workers requesting flexibility 
are seen as less competitive and ambitious and show a reduced commitment (Rudman and Mescher, 
2013) and, for this reason, they perceive lower wages and have fewer promotion opportunities than 
full-time male workers (Coltrane et al., 2013). In the particular case of involuntary part-time males, 
they could be seen as incompetent, because they do not get the full-time job they want (Pedulla, 2016). 
Given that the available evidence confirms that the flexibility stigma is more detrimental in practice 
in the case of part-time male workers than in the case of females as regards the possibility of obtaining 
call-backs to their job applications (Pedulla, 2016), a higher wage penalty associated to part-time jobs 
is plausibly expected to be found among male workers according to this theory.  
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2.2. Part-time wage penalties along the wage distribution 
As previously mentioned, the theory of dual labour markets (Doeringer and Piore, 1971) 
predicts a wage penalty for part-time jobs. As part of the secondary segment of the labour market, 
wages of part-time workers are lower than full-time ones due to their lower qualifications and their 
reduced bargaining power, so they will be mainly concentrated in the low tail of the wages distribution, 
where the wage penalty associated to part-time jobs would be higher. Moreover, as Tilly (1992) argues, 
part-time jobs can be also separated into two groups: one within the secondary segment (that would 
be predominant) but also a second one with jobs within the primary segment that would be offered 
to high qualified workers looking for flexibility in order to retain them. If this case, in this second 
group of part-time jobs, wage penalty would not exist or could become a positive premium. These 
jobs would be usually placed in the top tail of the wage distribution. So, according to this theory, the 
wage penalty associated to part-time jobs could vary along the wage distribution, being higher for low-
wage workers. 
On the opposite, from the theory of the career mobility (Sicherman and Galor, 1990) it can 
be deduced that the wage penalty along the wage distribution varies, but in a different way. In 
particular, according to this theory, the probability of job promotion depends on the ability, schooling 
and job experience of the workers. Seniority in the firm and in the specific job increases the probability 
of promotion as experience increases the required skills for an upward transition towards a better job. 
As part-time jobs limit the capacity of workers to acquire new knowledge and skills, their probability 
of promotion could be lower for part-time workers than for full-time ones. Moreover, as the 
probability of promotion also depends positively on schooling, the wage penalty associated to part-
time jobs would be higher for more educated workers, so from this theory we can predict an increasing 
penalty along the wage distribution with a higher penalty for top-wage workers. 
 
3. Data 
The empirical analysis carried out in this article is based on the matched employer-employee 
microdata of the most recent wave of the Structure of Earnings Survey (SES), corresponding to 2010. 
The SES is designed as independent cross-section databases updated every four years by the Spanish 
National Statistics Institute, and it is Spain’s sample for the European Structure of Earnings Survey, a survey 
carried out in all European Union member countries in accordance with a harmonised methodology. 
It is a nationally representative survey on firms that covers employees working in the month of 
October at establishments of any size and whose economic activity is framed in sections B to S of the 
sectoral classification NACE 2009. Therefore, it encompasses the bulk of the private sector of the 
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Spanish economy, excluding only specific sectors such as agriculture and domestic service. The survey 
design corresponds to a two-stage sampling of employees working in firms registered in the social 
security system, and hence one of its most important features is the inclusion of matched employer-
employee microdata (i.e., observations for several employees in each establishment). Moreover, it is 
important to note that it is a survey specifically designed to provide reliable information about the 
characteristics of the wage distribution in the Spanish labour market.  
Regarding the definition of part-time, in the SES each firm indicates the employee’s status as 
full- or part-time depending on his/her hours worked. Specifically, in the case of each worker the firm 
has to choose between full-time or part-time in response to the following question: ‘4.1 Type of job.’ It 
is considered part-time if hours worked are less than the normal working day of the firm or, in the absence of a normal 
working day, if they are lower than the maximum legally set (it must be stipulated in the contract). As regards the 
rest of variables, the SES provides detailed information on wages and the characteristics of workers 
(nationality, gender, age, and education); jobs (tenure and type of contract) and firms (sector, size, 
type of collective agreement and region). The wage concept used in this research is the gross hourly 
wage, calculated from the wage corresponding to a representative month (October) divided by the 
number of hours worked in that month. In this calculation, any payment by companies, including 
commissions, bonuses for night work and weekends, as well as overtime work, has been incorporated.  
The analysis is carried out separately for men and women due to the theoretical reasons 
described in the previous section. Moreover, following most previous studies on the relative wage 
treatment of part-time workers that limit the analysis to private sector employees, observations 
corresponding to the public sector (i.e., Section O, Public administration and defence, compulsory 
social security) have been removed.2 Finally, observations with missing values on key variables and 
those for individuals aged less than 16 years or over 65 years, or with hourly wages less than 2.5 euros 
or greater than 200 euros have been filtered. The final sample is formed by 152,099 observations, 
which correspond to 89,344 men (81,578 working full-time and 7,766 part-time) and 62,755 women 
(45,338 working full-time and 17,417 part-time). 
 
4. Methodology 
In the empirical analysis, we apply the methodology proposed by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo 
(2011), a technique that enhances the development of the empirical decompositions of differences 
between two distributions of a variable. This technique provides a breakdown of the differences 
between distributions in the value of any distributional statistic (as the value of a quantile or an 
inequality index) based on differences in the endowments of characteristics and in their returns. This 
                                                 
2 According to SES data for 2010, the incidence of part-time employment in Spain is much lower in the public sector than 
in the private both in the case of men (5.3% compared to 8.7%) and, especially, of women (10.3 % compared to 27.7%). 
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procedure has considerable advantages compared to techniques previously proposed in the literature, 
which also permit the decomposition of differences between distributions based on construction of 
counterfactual distributions (DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux, 1996; Juhn, Murphy and Pierce, 1993; 
Machado and Mata, 2005 and Melly, 2005, 2006). Thus, whereas the latter techniques consist of 
aggregated decompositions, which, aside from partial exceptions, provide exclusively the separate 
effects on the differential of differences in characteristics and returns, respectively, Fortin, Lemieux, 
and Firpo’s methodology provides a detailed decomposition that allows us to ascertain additionally 
the individual contribution of each explanatory variable for both components. 
This methodology is based on the estimation of a regression in which the independent variable 
(the wage) is substituted by a transformation of the same, the recentred influence function (RIF). 
Subsequently, a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition can be developed for any distributional 
statistic based on the regression results. 
The influence function measures the effect on distributional statistics of small changes in the 
underlying distribution. Thus, for a given distributional statistic of the distribution FW, v(F), this 
function measures the importance of each observation in shaping its value. Fortin, Lemieux, and 
Firpo (2011) suggest using a recentred version of the influence function having added the statistic of 
interest, RIF(W)=v(F)+IF(W), since it has as expected value the actual statistic v(F) (insofar as the 
expectation of the function of influence with respect to distribution of W is, by definition, zero).  
In the case of the quantiles θQ  of the unconditioned marginal distribution WF , the function 
of influence, ),( θQWIF , is defined as 
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where }{⋅l  is an indicator function and Wf is the function of density of the marginal 
distribution of W evaluated in θQ . 
Given that the function of recentered influence, ),( θQWRIF , is equal to ),( θθ QWIFQ + , 
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The RIF function may be computed empirically in the case of the quantiles by means of a 
local inversion following calculation of the dummy variable }{ θQWl < (which specifies whether the 
value W is higher or lower than θQ ), the estimation of the quantile of the sample θQ , and the 
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estimation by means of kernel density functions of the corresponding density function Wf  evaluated 
in θQ . 
Following calculation of the RIF function for the quantile, a value is provided for the 
transformed variable for each observation of the sample. Insofar as the effect of the change in 
distribution of an explanatory variable in the quantile may be expressed ceteris paribus, as the average 
partial effect of that variable in the conditioned expectation on its RIF function, and assuming that 
the conditioned expectation of the RIF function may be modelled as a linear function of the 
explanatory variables, these values may be used for estimation by means of ordinary least squares of 
a regression of the RIF variable in a vector of explanatory variables. The estimated coefficients of that 
regression may then be used for calculation of a standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition of different 
quantiles of the distribution. Following the recommendation of Oaxaca and Ransom (1994) and 
Neumark (1998), the wage structure of the two groups involved in the comparison has been used as 
the reference wage structure in the development of the decomposition.3  
Consequently, the decomposition takes the following form: 
{ })ˆˆ()ˆˆ(ˆ)( *** pQQfQfQpQfpQ XXXX θθθθθθ γγγγγ −+−+=∆ -                               (3) 
Wherein 
θQ
∆  is the difference in the quantile θQ  of the wage distributions of part- and full-time 
workers, respectively; pX  and fX  are the average observed characteristics for part- and full-time 
workers, and pQθγˆ , 
f
Qθ
γˆ  and *ˆ
θ
γ Q  are the estimated coefficients following regression of the RIF variable 
of the quantile θQ  on the group of explanatory variables for part-time workers, full-time workers, and 
the pool of both groups respectively. The first component of the right-hand side of the equation 
represents the effect on the differential between distributions caused by differences in characteristics 
(or the ‘explained’ component), whereas the second corresponds to the effect of the coefficients (or 
‘unexplained’ component). As previously referenced, the contribution of each explanatory factor 
through each of the two components can be observed in the decomposition results. 
 
5. Results 
 
5.1. Descriptive evidence 
Table 1 provides information on the raw wage differential between part-time and full-time 
workers, measured as the logarithm of the wage per hour and distinguishing between male and female 
                                                 
3 Although the use of other reference wage structures could lead to different results (for details on the 'index number 
problem' see Oaxaca and Ransom, 1994), the evidence obtained using as an alternative reference wage structure that for 
full-time workers is qualitatively similar. These results are available from the authors on request. 
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workers. A negative value (positive) of the differential corresponds to a wage disadvantage (advantage) 
of part-time workers. We observe that in Spain there is a significant negative average wage differential 
for part-time workers, although the gap is substantially lower in the case of men (the average value is 
of -0.104 logarithmic points) than of women (with an average gap of -0.254 logarithmic points). The 
wage differential, on the other hand, is not homogeneous along the wage distribution given that in 
the case of male workers the differential tends to decrease along the distribution, particularly in its 
right tail (until the point to be favourable for part-time workers in the right tail of the distribution), 
whereas in the case of females the differential increases along it. 
Tables A.1 and A.2 of the Appendix present descriptive statistics of the sample used in the 
empirical analysis, distinguishing between male and female workers and by the different quartiles of 
the wage distribution. According to these figures, there are significant differences in the characteristics 
of full-time and part-time workers, although these differences vary between male and female workers. 
In particular, in the case of female workers those working part-time present in general characteristics 
usually associated with lower wages: namely, higher presence of immigrants; lower average educational 
levels and seniority in firms; greater incidence of fixed-term contracts; less presence in high-wage 
sectors like manufacturing and construction; and higher presence in small firms without specific 
collective agreements. In the case of male part-time workers, although some characteristics are clearly 
unfavourable to their relative wages (e.g., higher presence of immigrants; lower seniority; a greater 
incidence of fixed-term contracts; higher presence in the service sector and in firms without specific 
collective agreements), other characteristics have the opposite effect (e.g., older and seniority). This 
last circumstance is mainly explained by the characteristics of males in the high part of the wage 
distribution, as better endowments of those variables are, in fact, only observed for part-time workers 
in the upper part of the distribution. Let us note that this finding is consistent with the fact that a 
significant portion of job contracts among part-time male workers in Spain are related to partial 
retirement and affect, hence, to individuals with greater age and seniority (Muñoz de Bustillo et al., 
2008). 
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5.2. Econometric results 
Figures 1 and 2 show the results of the decomposition of wage differences between part- and 
full-time male and female Spanish workers by quantiles of the wage distribution obtained after 
applying the methodology proposed by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011). The evidence has been 
obtained from a specification of the wage equation (1) that includes socio-demographic individual 
characteristics and job and firm attributes. The former are controls relating to the nationality of the 
individual (differentiating between natives and immigrants); the level of general education 
(distinguishing three levels: primary, secondary, and tertiary education) and age. The characteristics of 
the job are years of seniority in the current job (including its quadratic form) and type of contract 
(indefinite or fixed-term),4 while attributes of the firms are sector (12 categories corresponding to 
sections of the classification NACE-93); size (four categories); type of collective agreement 
(distinguishing between firm, national sector, and subnational sector agreements) and region of 
location of the firm (there are 17 regions in Spain). 
To facilitate the presentation, figure 1 distinguishes between the aggregated contribution to 
the wage differential of differences in characteristics and returns (the latter term corresponding hence 
to the wage penalty associated to part-time work), whereas figure 2 shows the detailed results of the 
separate effect of each explanatory variable included in equation (1) associated with the characteristics 
component.5 Variables have been grouped in this last figure according to three categories (individual, 
job and firms characteristics, respectively) to facilitate interpretation of the influence of individual 
explanatory variables on characteristics component. Additional information on the results of the 
decomposition can be found in tables 2 and 3. In particular, the first two rows of both tables show 
the log hourly wages of part- and full-time workers in different quantiles of the distribution (i.e. 1.692 
in Table 2 is the log hourly wages of part-time male workers in the 10th percentile); the third row 
shows the value of the raw differential in log hourly wages between part- and full-time workers in the 
quantiles of the distribution, whereas the next two rows show the value of the characteristics and 
coefficient terms of the decomposition (where a negative value indicates that the factor has a negative 
effect on the relative wages of part-time workers). The rest of the rows in the table show the specific 
impact of each of the individual explanatory variables on the characteristics component, including 
both the contribution in absolute terms and as a percentage of the total difference. 
In the case of male workers, aggregate results of the econometric decomposition (upper panel 
of figure 1) show that the wage disadvantage associated with part-time jobs observed in the left and 
                                                 
4 The SES also includes information on occupation. However, this variable has not been considered in the analysis, given 
that it potentially suffers from endogeneity in relation to the distribution of individuals between full- and part-time jobs, 
to the extent that part-time employment is often limited to low-wage occupations (for details, see Manning and 
Petrongolo, 2008). 
5 Estimated coefficients by means of unconditional quantile regressions required for the decomposition are available from the 
authors on request. 
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in the medium part of the distribution is due both to the worst endowment of characteristics of 
individuals with part-time contracts (i.e. the characteristics component) and the presence of a relative 
wage penalty (coefficients component). Moreover, the reduction of the wage gap observed particularly 
in the right part of the wage distribution is mainly due to the fact that the wage penalty reduces 
significantly its intensity in that part of the distribution (until a point where it becomes a wage 
premium for the last two deciles). 
As regards the detailed results related to the characteristics component (upper panel of figure 
2 and table 2), although differences in individual, job and firm characteristics are in all cases relevant 
origins of the wage disadvantage of part-time male workers, differences in job characteristics such as 
tenure and the incidence of fixed-term contracts are in particular the most important individuals 
contributors (note that these two aspects are clearly interrelated as the high job turnover due to the 
high share of fixed-term contracts in the Spanish labour market implies that many workers are not 
able to accumulate long periods of on-the-job experience). On the other hand, the slowly increasing 
profile along the distribution of the overall characteristics component is a result that is essentially 
explained by the change of sign of the effect of the type of contract (which reflects that there is a 
relatively higher incidence of permanent contracts in the case or part-time workers in the right tail of 
the distribution, in contrast with what is observed in the rest of the wage distribution) and the growing 
impact of the age variable, in the case of individual characteristics (reflecting that individuals located 
in the right tail of the distribution tend to be relatively older).  
In the case of women, the aggregate evidence in the lower panel of figure 1 confirms that 
differences in endowments of characteristics are systematically the main driver of the lower wages of 
part-time female workers along the wage distribution. However, the influence of this factor is not 
homogenous along the distribution, as it is comparatively more reduced in the left tail and grows 
significantly along it. Although with a less steeper profile, the contribution of the component 
associated with coefficients also shows an increasing trend along the wage distribution. 
Focusing now on the detailed results of the decomposition of the characteristics component, 
they reveal that differences in the endowments of individual, job and firm characteristics are also in 
this case relevant origins of the wage disadvantage of part-time workers (figure 2 and table 3). The 
particular domains that are especially harmful for the relative wages of part-time female workers are 
their lower tenure and, especially, education and their higher presence in low-wage sectors. Moreover, 
the increasing profile of the characteristics component is explained by the increasing importance of 
these three elements, since differences in sectoral distribution and in the endowments of tenure, and, 
particularly, education are very important and especially negative for female workers in the right tail 
of the distribution (as a matter of example, in the 90th percentile of the distribution they roughly 
explain all the influence of the characteristics component and about 70% of the total raw gap). This 
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finding suggests, hence, that although the relative segregation into low-wage sectors also plays a role, 
one of the main drivers of the wage disadvantage of part-time work females is their lower endowments 
of human capital. 
Last, and moving to the wage penalties captured by the coefficients component, the obtained 
evidence shows that the wage penalty for part-time male workers is higher than for females in most 
part of the wage distribution. This result seems to confirm the predictions derived by Pedulla (2016) 
from the ‘flexibility stigma’ theory for involuntary part-time male workers. 
According to the obtained results, the wage penalty for male part-time workers compared to 
full-time male workers is higher in the bottom than in the top part of the wage distribution. In 
particular, it reduces with more intensity after the sixth decile and it becomes a wage premium after 
the ninth decile. This result can be explained by the fact that the Spanish legislation allows workers 
older than 60 to work part-time without any loss of acquired rights as a previous step to retirement.6 
On the other hand, our results regarding the wage penalty for male part-time workers confirm the 
predictions derived from the segmentation theory and, in particular, the existence of a primary 
segment within part-time jobs as suggested by Tilly (1992). The evidence is also similar to the one 
found by Tönurist and Pavlopoulos (2014) for Germany, but opposite to the evidence for Swedish 
men by Wahlberg (2008). 
In the case of women, we have found a wage penalty that is relatively stable until the fourth 
decile when it clearly increases achieving the maximum at the top part of the wage distribution. As 
opposite to males, these results are consistent with the conclusions derived from the theory of career 
mobility: an increasing penalty along the wage distribution and higher for women in the right part of 
the distribution (which, on the other hand, are those more qualified, with more years of experience, 
higher schooling, and higher levels of seniority: for detailed evidence see table A.2). This higher 
penalty for more qualified and educated women is in line with two phenomena highlighted in the 
empirical literature. On one hand, the returns to schooling years could be relatively lower as the 
transition from full-time to part-time work usually involves occupational downgrading (Connolly and 
Gregory, 2009), particularly in those countries, like Spain, where the law does not contemplate the 
right of the employee to keep the same job when reducing working time.7 Additionally, those who 
work part-time have a lower probability of being promoted in the firm (Russo and Hassik, 2008) and 
show less wage progress when they achieve it (Wolf, 2014 and Fernández-Kranz and Rodríguez-
                                                 
6 Moreover, Pérez et al. (2015) have also found evidence of a complementarity or shared leisure effect for older males in 
Spain. In particular, their results show that wife’s employment leads the husband to remain active in the labour market. 
So, part-time work can be a good option for older males while their wives still participate in the labour market. 
7 In countries like Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany or France the worker can change to part-time status with 
neither loss of category nor responsibility, except in determinate circumstances, which minimises the risk of occupational 
downgrading. In the UK, where this possibility does not exist, Connolly and Gregory (2009) found that 25.6% of the 
women that opt by part-time jobs suffer occupational downgrading, representing an hourly wage decrease of 32%. 
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Planas, 2011). As career mobility highlights, these factors affect, in greater measure, those who have 
more schooling(more degradation) and more years of potential experience (more lost promotions).8 
Our results are in line with the evidence found by Wahlberg (2008) for Swedish women and 
by Colella (2014) for Italian women. Colella (2014) also founds that for Dutch women the penalty 
increases in the bottom and in the top part of the distribution (inverse U-shaped). The same author 
finds that in Germany and France the penalty for females decrease or even becomes a positive 
premium in the top deciles of the wage distribution. 
 
6. Conclusions 
This article examines wage differentials between part-time and full-time workers in Spain 
distinguishing by gender. Our analysis contributes to the literature by considering differences along 
the wage distribution, given that previous evidence on this issue is non-existent for Spain and is rather 
scarce for other advanced countries. We consider that Spain is an interesting analysis case from an 
international perspective given the significant increase of part-time work during the last years, but 
especially because in contrast with most other advanced countries a majority of part-time employment 
in Spain is involuntary both for males and females. 
The research is based on cross-section matched employer-employee microdata from a large 
representative survey (the Encuesta de Estructura Salarial) which is carried out with a harmonised 
methodology common to all European Union member countries and that covers almost exhaustively 
the private sector in Spain. The survey has been designed specifically to provide reliable evidence 
about characteristics of the wage distribution such us wage differentials associated with the type of 
working time. On the other hand, from a methodological point of view, we apply the econometric 
decomposition technique proposed recently by Fortin, Lemieux, and Firpo (2011) to decompose wage 
differences between part-time and full-time workers by quantiles of the wage distribution. This 
methodology has the advantage over similar techniques that provides a detailed decomposition of 
wage differentials and has not been used before to examine this topic. 
The evidence for Spain shows that the wage disadvantage associated with part-time work 
differs substantially along the wage distribution, increasing for women and decreasing for men (until 
the point at which in the latter case it vanishes in the right tail of the distribution). Results from the 
decompositions suggest that in the case of part-time females the wage disadvantage is mostly 
                                                 
8 Unlike female workers, these phenomena are not observed for male workers. In fact, the returns to experience do not 
have the same negative impact for males. The most reasonable explanation is that in a lot of cases these workers change 
to part-time jobs after several years of full-time dedication, having accumulated specific human capital at the same level 
as other full-time workers. Men’s returns to education do not have the same penalty as for women, reflecting the absence 
of occupational downgrading although working part-time—a result that is in line with the fact that there is a significant 
proportion of advanced age men who access a partial retirement, without changing firms or occupations. 
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explained by their relative endowments of characteristics, given that part-time female workers present 
in general characteristics associated with lower wages. The detailed results obtained via the 
econometric decomposition suggest that the particular domains that are especially harmful for the 
relative wages of part-time female workers are their lower endowments of human capital (i.e. tenure 
and, especially, education) and their segregation into low-wage sectors. Yet, even after having 
controlled for differences in characteristics a wage penalty for female part-time workers still persists 
with an increasing profile along the wage distribution. The female wage penalty profile confirms the 
prediction derived from the career mobility hypothesis. In the case of males the wage disadvantage of 
part-time workers observed in the lower part of the distribution is due both to their relatively worse 
endowments of characteristics (with a particularly relevant influence of job characteristics such as a 
lower tenure or a higher incidence of fixed-term contracts) and a significant wage penalty, , confirming 
the hypothesis derived from the segmentation theory. Yet, in the upper part of the distribution the 
wage penalty vanishes, very probably due to the existence of part-time job contracts related to partial 
retirement with all acquired rights which tend to affect more to males with higher wages. Overall, 
hence, our evidence for Spain seems to indicate that part-time work tends to affect differently to the 
wages of males and females, with a higher penalty for part-time males, as predicted by the ‘flexibility 
stigma’ theory, and penalising low-qualified men located in the lower part of the wage distribution 
and high-qualified women located in the upper part of the distribution the most. 
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Figures and tables 
 
Figure 1. 
Aggregate decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time employees. Fortin-Lemieux-
Firpo decomposition. Males (upper panel) and females (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics and job and firm attributes have been considered as explanatory variables. 
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Figure 2. 
Detailed decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time employees. Fortin-Lemieux-
Firpo decomposition. Males (upper panel) and females (lower panel). 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Individual characteristics and job and firm attributes have been considered as explanatory variables. 
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Table 1. 
Wage differentials between part- and full-time workers in Spain. 
 Males Females 
Average -0.104 -0.254 
Percentiles   
5 -0.191 -0.099 
10 -0.178 -0.112 
20 -0.160 -0.137 
30 -0.165 -0.176 
40 -0.159 -0.219 
50 -0.155 -0.266 
60 -0.125 -0.319 
70 -0.099 -0.358 
80 -0.080 -0.388 
90 -0.016 -0.391 
95  0.084 -0.375 
Notes: The wage gap corresponds to the differential of the logarithm of the 
hourly wage. 
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Table 2. 
Decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time workers. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo decomposition. Males. 
  Quantiles 
  10th perc.  25th perc. Median 75th perc. 90th perc.  
Total Part-time 1.692  1.896  2.176  2.663  3.090  
  (0.006)***  (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.013)***  (0.019)***  
 Full-time 1.867  2.051  2.345  2.720  3.084  
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  
 Difference -0.176  -0.155  -0.169  -0.057  0.006  
  (0.006)***  (0.005)***  (0.006)***  (0.013)***  -0.02  
 Characteristics -0.074 42.0% -0.072 46.5% -0.089 52.7% -0.052 91.2% -0.053 -883.3% 
  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.007)***  (0.009)***  
 Coefficients -0.102 58.0% -0.084 54.2% -0.080 47.3% -0.005 8.8% 0.059 983.3% 
  (0.005)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  (0.010)  (0.016)***  
Characteristics Nationality -0.002 1.1% -0.002 1.3% -0.003 1.8% -0.000 0.0% 0.002 33.3% 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)  (0.000)***  
 Age 0.002 -1.1% 0.004 -2.6% 0.008 -4.7% 0.020 -35.1% 0.029 483.3% 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  
 Education -0.006 3.4% -0.009 5.8% -0.019 11.2% -0.033 57.9% -0.042 -700.0% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  
 Tenure -0.018 10.2% -0.019 12.3% -0.022 13.0% -0.009 15.8% -0.012 -200.0% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  
 Contract -0.025 14.2% -0.028 18.1% -0.033 19.5% -0.012 21.1% 0.011 183.3% 
  (0.002)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  
 Region 0.005 -2.8% 0.006 -3.9% 0.009 -5.3% 0.010 -17.5% 0.008 133.3% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
 Sector -0.028 15.9% -0.023 14.8% -0.032 18.9% -0.039 68.4% -0.060 -1000.0% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  
 Size 0.000 0.0% -0.001 0.6% 0.001 -0.6% 0.005 -8.8% 0.005 83.3% 
  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
 Collective agreement -0.001 0.6% 0.001 -0.6% 0.003 -1.8% 0.007 -12.3% 0.005 83.3% 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
N  89.344  89.344  89.344  89.344  89.344  
Notes: The right part of each column contains the contribution of each characteristic as a percentage of the total difference in hourly wages between part- and full-time workers. 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Table 3. 
Decomposition of wage differentials between part- and full-time workers. Fortin-Lemieux-Firpo decomposition. Males. 
  Quantiles 
  10th perc.  25th perc. Median 75th perc. 90th perc.  
Total Part-time 1.616  1.760  1.944  2.215  2.557  
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.005)***  (0.009)***  
 Full-time 1.724  1.915  2.216  2.590  2.948  
  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  
 Difference -0.107  -0.155  -0.272  -0.374  -0.390  
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.007)***  (0.010)***  
 Characteristics -0.068 63.6% -0.114 73.5% -0.218 80.1% -0.311 83.2% -0.297 76.2% 
  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  
 Coefficients -0.039 36.4% -0.040 25.8% -0.054 19.9% -0.064 17.1% -0.093 23.8% 
  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  (0.004)***  (0.005)***  (0.009)***  
Characteristics Nationality -0.001 0.9% -0.002 1.3% -0.001 0.4% 0.001 -0.3% 0.003 -0.8% 
  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)***  
 Age -0.000 0.0% -0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.000 0.0% 0.001 -0.3% 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.001)  
 Education -0.029 27.1% -0.048 31.0% -0.091 33.5% -0.144 38.5% -0.142 36.4% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  (0.003)***  
 Tenure -0.019 17.8% -0.033 21.3% -0.056 20.6% -0.073 19.5% -0.068 17.4% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  
 Contract -0.003 2.8% -0.001 0.6% -0.003 1.1% -0.002 0.5% 0.005 -1.3% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)*  (0.001)***  
 Region -0.001 0.9% -0.001 0.6% -0.004 1.5% -0.006 1.6% -0.013 3.3% 
  (0.001)**  (0.001)**  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
 Sector -0.011 10.3% -0.020 12.9% -0.043 15.8% -0.063 16.8% -0.063 16.2% 
  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.002)***  (0.003)***  
 Size -0.004 3.7% -0.005 3.2% -0.006 2.2% -0.006 1.6% -0.005 1.3% 
  (0.000)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
 Collective agreement 0.001 -0.9% -0.004 2.6% -0.014 5.1% -0.019 5.1% -0.014 3.6% 
  (0.001)  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  (0.001)***  
N  62,755  62,755  62,755  62,755  62,755  
Notes: The right part of each column contains the contribution of each characteristic as a percentage of the total difference in hourly wages between part- and full-time workers. 
* p<0,1; ** p<0,05; *** p<0,01 
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Appendix 
Table A.1. Descriptive statistics. Males. 
 Full-time Part-time 
 Total Average Total Average 
 
Average S.D. Parts of the wage distribution Average S.D. Parts of the wage distribution   <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 
Logarithm of hourly wage 2.423 0.494 1.874 2.201 2.519 3.097 2.318 0.591 1.709 2.040 2.404 3.121 
Immigrant 0.065 0.247 0.124 0.072 0.037 0.028 0.093 0.297 0.147 0.128 0.060 0.036 
Primary education  0.183 0.387 0.278 0.232 0.157 0.067 0.233 0.423 0.259 0.224 0.251 0.198 
Secondary education  0.598 0.490 0.670 0.664 0.621 0.436 0.585 0.493 0.637 0.668 0.555 0.482 
Tertiary education  0.219 0.414 0.052 0.104 0.222 0.497 0.181 0.385 0.104 0.108 0.194 0.320 
Age 40.640 10.150 37.390 39.330 41.010 44.810 42.740 14.830 36.110 37.890 45.030 51.900 
Tenure 9.351 9.676 4.738 7.638 10.530 14.490 9.877 13.410 3.292 4.954 11.870 19.400 
Fixed-term contract 0.811 0.391 0.665 0.781 0.863 0.935 0.444 0.497 0.501 0.548 0.419 0.307 
Andalusia 0.099 0.299 0.103 0.104 0.090 0.101 0.111 0.314 0.134 0.121 0.095 0.095 
Aragon 0.042 0.201 0.035 0.051 0.050 0.034 0.038 0.191 0.028 0.037 0.044 0.042 
Asturias 0.034 0.181 0.034 0.037 0.038 0.026 0.028 0.164 0.025 0.021 0.026 0.038 
Balearics 0.023 0.151 0.030 0.028 0.020 0.016 0.052 0.223 0.044 0.052 0.062 0.051 
Canary Islands 0.042 0.201 0.073 0.037 0.030 0.029 0.033 0.179 0.061 0.027 0.026 0.019 
Cantabria 0.027 0.161 0.033 0.030 0.025 0.019 0.026 0.158 0.024 0.024 0.023 0.032 
Castilla-Leon 0.054 0.227 0.067 0.053 0.052 0.045 0.045 0.208 0.050 0.040 0.041 0.051 
Castilla La Mancha 0.042 0.201 0.055 0.047 0.037 0.029 0.032 0.176 0.029 0.036 0.037 0.026 
Catalonia 0.163 0.369 0.102 0.152 0.190 0.209 0.187 0.390 0.139 0.195 0.216 0.199 
Valencia 0.083 0.275 0.091 0.092 0.081 0.066 0.084 0.278 0.093 0.091 0.100 0.053 
Extremadura 0.024 0.151 0.050 0.020 0.013 0.012 0.017 0.127 0.030 0.019 0.011 0.007 
Galicia 0.055 0.228 0.081 0.065 0.043 0.031 0.040 0.196 0.042 0.045 0.034 0.040 
Madrid 0.171 0.377 0.138 0.138 0.169 0.240 0.172 0.377 0.209 0.181 0.142 0.157 
Murcia 0.031 0.174 0.046 0.036 0.024 0.020 0.026 0.159 0.038 0.027 0.025 0.014 
Navarre 0.030 0.169 0.015 0.033 0.044 0.027 0.029 0.166 0.009 0.026 0.032 0.047 
Basque Country 0.063 0.243 0.027 0.055 0.082 0.089 0.068 0.252 0.034 0.040 0.077 0.124 
The Rioja 0.016 0.125 0.022 0.021 0.014 0.007 0.012 0.109 0.012 0.020 0.010 0.007 
Industry 0.424 0.494 0.354 0.438 0.488 0.415 0.288 0.453 0.161 0.208 0.345 0.437 
Construction 0.122 0.327 0.171 0.154 0.096 0.066 0.037 0.188 0.027 0.047 0.042 0.031 
Services 0.454 0.498 0.475 0.408 0.416 0.518 0.675 0.468 0.812 0.745 0.613 0.532 
Firm size less than 20 0.105 0.307 0.196 0.122 0.060 0.043 0.138 0.345 0.203 0.195 0.103 0.051 
Firm size 10-49 0.238 0.426 0.332 0.287 0.198 0.137 0.195 0.396 0.236 0.228 0.182 0.134 
Firm size 50-199 0.277 0.447 0.261 0.298 0.297 0.250 0.226 0.418 0.214 0.224 0.244 0.221 
Firm size 500 or more 0.380 0.485 0.211 0.293 0.445 0.571 0.441 0.497 0.348 0.353 0.471 0.594 
National sect. collect. agr. 0.286 0.452 0.319 0.282 0.255 0.288 0.282 0.450 0.380 0.312 0.238 0.200 
Sub-national sect. coll. agr. 0.416 0.493 0.527 0.507 0.385 0.243 0.388 0.487 0.362 0.466 0.424 0.302 
Firm collective agreement 0.299 0.458 0.154 0.211 0.360 0.469 0.329 0.470 0.258 0.222 0.338 0.498 
Number of observations 81,578 20,394 20,394 20,394 20,394 7,766 1,941 1,941 1,941 1,941 
Notes: The table includes descriptive (mean and standard deviation) for each of the groups (individuals with full- and part-time) and the value of the average of the 
variables for the four sections of the wage distribution defined by the three quartiles. 
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Table A.2.  
Descriptive statistics. Females. 
 Full-time Part-time 
 Total Average Total Average 
 
Average S.D. Parts of the wage distribution Average S.D. Parts of the wage distribution   <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 <p25 p25-p50 p50-p75 >p75 
Logarithm of hourly wage 2.282 0.481 1.736 2.062 2.384 2.945 2.028 0.400 1.623 1.854 2.059 2.576 
Immigrant  0.102 0.303 0.191 0.129 0.064 0.024 0.200 0.400 0.261 0.240 0.199 0.101 
Primary education 0.051 0.222 0.093 0.057 0.034 0.024 0.080 0.271 0.097 0.087 0.069 0.068 
Secondary education  0.542 0.498 0.703 0.651 0.539 0.274 0.637 0.481 0.678 0.672 0.669 0.529 
Tertiary education  0.356 0.479 0.105 0.220 0.397 0.701 0.163 0.369 0.061 0.088 0.131 0.370 
Age 39.080 9.826 37.090 37.770 39.360 42.110 39.200 10.920 39.300 39.200 38.900 39.410 
Tenure 8.320 9.059 4.590 6.562 9.498 12.630 5.114 6.623 3.360 4.283 5.315 7.500 
Fixed-term contract 0.800 0.400 0.743 0.777 0.817 0.862 0.666 0.472 0.621 0.668 0.701 0.675 
Andalusia 0.080 0.272 0.077 0.087 0.080 0.078 0.134 0.341 0.166 0.138 0.119 0.113 
Aragon 0.038 0.191 0.038 0.047 0.041 0.025 0.036 0.186 0.027 0.037 0.043 0.037 
Asturias 0.025 0.156 0.043 0.028 0.017 0.013 0.025 0.155 0.038 0.030 0.014 0.016 
Balearics 0.026 0.158 0.025 0.023 0.027 0.027 0.037 0.189 0.029 0.027 0.043 0.050 
Canary Islands 0.044 0.205 0.059 0.045 0.037 0.035 0.040 0.196 0.068 0.035 0.029 0.027 
Cantabria 0.018 0.135 0.023 0.018 0.017 0.016 0.023 0.149 0.017 0.032 0.027 0.015 
Castilla-Leon 0.048 0.213 0.052 0.047 0.046 0.045 0.055 0.228 0.049 0.070 0.054 0.048 
Castilla La Mancha 0.037 0.188 0.044 0.039 0.032 0.032 0.029 0.167 0.034 0.032 0.026 0.024 
Catalonia 0.201 0.401 0.142 0.202 0.231 0.228 0.187 0.390 0.146 0.156 0.218 0.228 
Valencia 0.076 0.265 0.101 0.083 0.070 0.050 0.080 0.271 0.096 0.095 0.064 0.064 
Extremadura 0.016 0.125 0.023 0.011 0.014 0.015 0.020 0.139 0.036 0.015 0.016 0.012 
Galicia 0.059 0.236 0.094 0.061 0.048 0.035 0.047 0.211 0.070 0.052 0.036 0.029 
Madrid 0.223 0.416 0.182 0.192 0.226 0.291 0.170 0.376 0.138 0.187 0.164 0.189 
Murcia 0.026 0.158 0.033 0.024 0.024 0.021 0.027 0.163 0.037 0.027 0.025 0.020 
Navarre 0.020 0.141 0.017 0.027 0.026 0.011 0.020 0.139 0.008 0.016 0.029 0.026 
Basque Country 0.052 0.222 0.029 0.051 0.056 0.072 0.060 0.237 0.029 0.033 0.082 0.094 
The Rioja 0.012 0.108 0.018 0.017 0.008 0.005 0.013 0.111 0.012 0.018 0.011 0.009 
Industry 0.220 0.414 0.231 0.245 0.217 0.185 0.093 0.291 0.095 0.083 0.091 0.105 
Construction 0.014 0.117 0.007 0.016 0.017 0.015 0.005 0.073 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.006 
Services 0.766 0.423 0.762 0.739 0.765 0.800 0.902 0.298 0.903 0.912 0.902 0.889 
Firm size less than 20 0.085 0.280 0.160 0.094 0.057 0.031 0.123 0.329 0.163 0.122 0.115 0.094 
Firm size 10-49 0.171 0.377 0.249 0.202 0.144 0.091 0.153 0.360 0.153 0.153 0.162 0.142 
Firm size 50-199 0.218 0.413 0.243 0.251 0.212 0.168 0.235 0.424 0.250 0.248 0.230 0.212 
Firm size 500 or more 0.525 0.499 0.349 0.453 0.587 0.711 0.489 0.500 0.434 0.477 0.493 0.552 
National sect. collect. agr. 0.349 0.477 0.421 0.353 0.316 0.307 0.304 0.460 0.331 0.299 0.292 0.294 
Sub-national sect. coll. agr. 0.303 0.460 0.388 0.370 0.269 0.186 0.458 0.498 0.433 0.530 0.490 0.380 
Firm collective agreement 0.348 0.476 0.192 0.277 0.415 0.507 0.238 0.426 0.236 0.172 0.217 0.327 
Number of observations 45,338 11,334 11,334 11,334 11,334 17,417 4,354 4,354 4,354 4,354 
Notes: The table includes descriptive (mean and standard deviation) for each of the groups (individuals with full- and part-time) and the value of the average of the 
variables for the four sections of the wage distribution defined by the three quartiles. 
